Introduction
As noted in chapter 2, social capital is a resource that promises to resolve some of the most important issues in social science (such as the relation between the "under-" and "super"-socialized views of human beings, as Coleman (1988) claimed), but also a wide variety of economic, political, and social problems. However, we know little about how this resource is created. Given that it is supposed to bring such great returns, the obvious question is: how can we invest in social capital?
In the remainder of this book, I seek to find an answer to this question. I begin this chapter by defining why investment in social capital is problematic. I consider the public-good features of some forms of social capital, in order to identify more precisely the problem of creating this kind of capital. In the rest of the book I suggest some ways in which these problems might be overcome.
The Public-Good Features of Social Capital in General
One of the peculiarities of social capital is that it has some of the features of a public good. A pure public good has two properties (Taylor, 1987: 5-6; Ostrom et al., 1994 : 6-7):
(1) The difficulty of excluding individuals from benefiting from it; and (2) The non-subtractability of the benefits consumed by one individual from those available to others.
According to James Coleman, social capital has features that differentiate it from private good and make it something more akin to a public good. On the one hand, it is a nonalienable good. Social capital, unlike physical or human capital, is not a property, but a resource accessible to all participants in a social network. This makes it difficult to trade. In fact, trust, whatever its effectiveness, for example, in easing economic exchange, is a kind of commodity on which it is impossible to put a price, or sell in an open market (Arrow, 1974: 23) .Another difference with respect to private goods (including the other two forms of capital, human and physical), is that an individual who participates in the creation of social capital does not obtain all the returns from it, a factor that can lead to underinvestment in social capital (Coleman, 1990: 315-317 ).This second public-good feature of social capital, relating to the nonexclusivity of public goods, is especially interesting because it concerns one of the main attractions of the concept: social capital does not only benefit those who participate in its creation, but also has external effects on the wider community (Putnam, 2000: 20) . It is precisely these externalities, typical of public goods, that make investment in these goods so complicated.Take, for example, the positive externalities that participation in associations has for democracy. Let us suppose, as Rosenstone and Hansen (1993) among others, argue, that it is true that participation in associations provides the participants with a by-product of relevant information that makes it easier to hold politicians accountable. Let us now imagine that a member of that association wins a prize in the lottery, and decides to move to his own private island, where the pleasures of associative life are not so widely appreciated. This decision supposes a payoff for him that clearly exceeds its costs.These costs include the loss in social capital that he suffers after abandoning his friends. Let us now imagine that all the members of the association, the lucky fellows, have also won prizes in the same lottery, and that all of them decide to move in search of better weather. From each of their individual points of view, their decision can be seen as correct, given that the cost for each of them in terms of the loss of social capital is clearly surpassed by the benefits of moving. Nevertheless, the aggregate outcome of these individual decisions could be a severe drop in the community's stock of social capital.
Coleman's conclusion is that, given that most of the benefits attached to actions relating to the creation of social capital are not enjoyed by those who create it, people are not interested in investing in social capital. This can encourage free-rider behavior. Let us suppose once more that the presence of all kinds of associations in a given community provides the members of those associations with the information they need to make the government more accountable. Let us further suppose that
